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PROFITS FROM MERGER: THE EVIDENCE
OF FIFTY YEARSt
THOMAS F. HOGARTY*
The extent, causes, and potential consequences of merger activity have
recently been uppermost in the minds of many businessmen, public officials,
and contributors to the financial press. This active interest has been due, in
large part, to the recent increase in the level of merger activity.
Any attempt to evaluate the significance of current merger activity must
consider the profitability of this activity. If mergers are more profitable than
alternative forms of investment, then they can be expected to increase sig-
nificantly in the future, perhaps at an accelerated rate. Similarly, the con-
sequences of mergers for the firms involved and for the economy as a whole
also depend on their relative profitability.
Mergers are not new to the American economy and their profitability
has been studied intermittently for at least 50 years. This paper will first
briefly review the methodology and results obtained in the principal studies
of merger profitability which have been published. Secondly, I shall present
the results of some of my own work in this area.1
I. EARLY STUDIES
The first merger wave, which began after the Civil War and reached its
peak around the turn of the century, has been examined extensively. There
were four principal studies of the success of mergers which occurred during
this period.
The first to appear was a study by Arthur Dewing,2 measuring the profit
experience of 35 major consolidations which had been completed at least 10
years prior to 1914.
Confronted with the problem of measuring merger success, Dewing
chose three (separate) standards: (1) the consolidation should produce profits
higher than the sum of the firms entering it; (2) the combination should
approximately live up to the expectations of its promoters; and (3) the
average profits subsequent to the merger should be significantly greater-
t This article was undertaken at the suggestion of Michael Gort, who also provided
considerable advice and criticism. Nonetheless, any errors or omissions are the sole respon-
sibility of the author.
*Assistant Professor of Economics, Northern Illinois University. B.A., Holy Cross
College, 1961; Ph.D., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1969. Formerly Economist,
Federal Trade Commission, 1966-1969.
1 Two forthcoming studies present a detailed examination of merger profitability from
the viewpoint of both the acquiring firm and the acquired firm. See Gort & Hogarty, New
Evidence on Mergers (publication forthcoming in J. LAw & EcoN.); Hogarty, The Profit-
ability of Corporate Mergers (publication forthcoming in J. Bus.).
2 See Dewing, A Statistical Test of the Success of Consolidations, 36 Q.J. ECON. 84
(1921).
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over a 10 year period - than those immediately preceding or following the
combination.
With profits measured as "the net earnings after taxes and depreciation
but before the payment of any interest or dividends,"8 Dewing found that
the 35 consolidations performed poorly on all three standards. For example,
only 13 of the 35 had higher profits after the merger (10 year average) than
before. Not surprisingly, the consolidations did not fulfill the expectations
of promoters. In 30 of the 35 cases the profits estimated by the promoters
exceeded the average profits actually obtained over the 10 years subsequent
to merger.
Dewing's study was followed by an inquiry undertaken by the National
Industrial Conference Board, which examined the rate of return and stock
price behavior of a group of 48 consolidations for the years 1900-1913.4 The
Board reached conclusions similar to those obtained by Dewing, but also
warned against the efficacy of statistical measures in measuring merger suc-
cess. Thus, the Board reached no substantive conclusions, but its emphasis
on rate of return and security price performance as the relevant criteria for
judging merger success was to be followed in subsequent examinations of
profitability in mergers occurring at the turn of the century.
Shaw Livermore, compiling a master list of mergers which occurred
about the turn of the century, undertook a study of 328 major consolida-
tions, which he divided into a primary group of 156 and a secondary group
of 172, the first being composed of firms possessing significant market power.5
He then set up six categories of profitability: early failures, later failures,
limping group, rejuvenations, successes, and outstanding successes. Liver-
more identified the third and fourth groups as not unambiguously successful
or unsuccessful. Firms were classified into one of the categories partly ac-
cording to their rate of return and partly according to survey information
on dividend records and company histories. The results were that classes
five and six (successes, outstanding successes) comprised 42 percent of the
primary group and 47 percent of the secondary group. These results in-
dicated that about one-half of all the consolidations of the period were
successful.
As support for his classification scheme, Livermore subsequently com-
pared the aggregate average rate of return for 49 of the successful companies
(comprised of firms from classes five and six) from the primary group with
Epstein's sample for the years 1919-1932.6
Generally speaking, the 49 successful merging companies did at least as
well as Epstein's group, although the difference was large only for the sub-
group of 10 "outstanding successes."
3Id. at 89.
4 See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, MERGERS IN INDUSTRY (1929).
5 See Livermore, The Success of Industrial Mergers, 50 Q.J. ECON. 68 (1935).
6 See R. EPSTEIN, INDUSTRIAL PROFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (1934). Epstein's sample
was a broadly based cross section of American industry.
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Ralph Nelson selected a sample of 13 large consolidations formed either
in 1899 or 1901. 7 Using the market price of common stock prevailing on the
first market day in December of the year of consolidation, together with the
market price prevailing nine years later, he computed a crude rate of return
in, which cash dividends, while included, were assumed to be not reinvested.
For the 13 consolidations, the median rate of return was 1.9 percent per
annum; the mean return was 5.9 percent per annum using a simple average,
and 7.4 percent per annum using a weighted average (weights were deter-
mined by authorized capitalization).
Since during this period the dividend commonly offered on preferred
stock was 7 percent and that offered on industrial bonds was 5 percent, these
average rates of return were unspectacular, considering that common stock
typically means greater risk.
All three studies had methodological deficiencies. Dewing's study has
limited usefulness since his premerger data included the relatively profitable
years of the 1890's, while the postmerger data covered the panics of 1903.
1904 and 1907. Livermore's study was handicapped by the fact that, although
the combinations he examined were formed at the turn of the century, his
comparative rate of return data on these companies pertained to the years
1919-1932. Such a long lag would generally ensure lack of difference between
merging and non-merging companies. Nelson's test has a major weakness: by
using as an initial (premerger) price the stock price prevailing in December
of the year of consolidation, Nelson's results indicate simply that investors'
expectations were exaggerated. His findings have no bearing on the question
of profitability of mergers, since profitability involves a comparison of what
happened after merger with what might have happened in the absence of
merger.
II. RECENT STUDIES
* While no studies of merger profitability were made for those acquisitions
which occurred during 1920-1929, there have been two major studies of the
profitability of mergers in the postwar period. The first was by Eamon
Kelly.S This author selected a sample of 21 firms from the population of
the largest 500 industrial firms and the largest 50 merchandising firms. Each
of these 21 firms had made acquisitions representing at least a 20 percent
increase in sales. He then selected another sample of 21 non-merging firms
(no more than a 5 percent increase in sales due to merger) which most
closely matched the original 21 in all other respects. The period covered
was from 1946 to 1960.
Adopting an agnostic position, Kelly presented five measures of profit-
ability: percentage change in price of common stock, in price earnings
ratio, in earnings per share, in net sales per common share, and in profit
7 T See R. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERCAN INDusTRY, 1895-1956, at 96-99 (1959).
8 See E. KELLY, THE PROFITABILITY OF GROWTH THROUGH MERGERS (1967).
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margin (cash flow relative to sales). The percentage change was computed
from the mean (median) of the premerger period to the mean (median) of
the postmerger period. The premerger period was defined as the five years
preceding merger; the postmerger period consisted of the five years following
merger.
Non-merging companies experienced a slight advantage in profit margin
gains and gains in earnings per share; merging companies were dominant in
the comparisons based on price-earnings ratios and sales per share. In terms
of capital gains (changes in stock prices), neither merging nor non-merging
companies had an advantage. Thus, on balance, Kelly's study yielded the
conclusion that mergers have a more or less neutral impact on the profit-
ability of acquiring companies.
Kelly's study, while better than some that preceded it, is subject to severe
shortcomings. First, his small sample and "matching technique" raise ques-
tions about the scope of his analysis and the viability of successfully match-
ing firms. For example, are the National Tea Company and the Great Atlan-
tic and Pacific Tea Company really identical in all respects except merger?
Are American Tobacco Company and Philip Morris, Inc.? A preferable pro-
cedure would be to assign each company to an industry or some such similar
group in order to minimize the possibility of distortions stemming from in-
dividual differences. Second, and more important, Kelly's wide array of
profitability measures is unsuitable for the task he undertook. Rather than
five partially relevant measures, Kelly would have been better off had he
computed one crucial measure, namely, the total return to common stock-
holders from capital gains and cash dividends.
Another author who examined the profitability of mergers in the post-
war period was Samuel Reid.9 This study examined the relationship between
profitability and merger activity for large industrial firms and banks. Since
the results obtained and methodology used in both cases was similar, I shall
consider only the results pertaining to large industrial firms.
Reid began by choosing a sample of 478 large industrial firms from
among the group consisting of the 500 largest industrials for 1961. These
478 firms were then classified into 4 groups:
(1) Pure internal growth firms - firms with no reported mergers, 1951-
1961.
(2) Occasional acquirers-firms with 1 to 5 reported mergers, 1951-
1961.
(3) Moderate acquirers - firms with 6 to 10 reported mergers, 1951-
1961.
(4) Active acquirers - firms with 11 or more reported mergers, 1951-
1961.
He then compared the relative profit performance of firms in each
9 See S. RE D, MERGERS, MANAGERS, AND THE ECONOMY (1968).
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group, utilizing a one-way analysis of variance. There were three measures
of profitability:
MPt- MP_,
(1) MP,-,
P, - P,-,(2) At-,
Pt - Pt-i
(3) St-2
where:
MP = market price of common
Nt-PIt- Pt*-i Pt -Pt-1
Nt
P - earnings available for common
N = number of shares outstanding
A = assets
S = sales
t, t - 1 = 1961 and 1951, respectively
The simple analysis of variance showed that the group means of each
of the profit measures differed significantly (.005 level). The greater the
number of acquisitions, the lower the level of profitability (measured three
ways).
When the 478 firms were classified into 14 industrial groupings, the
negative relationship between profitability and number of mergers was
weakened.
For the first measure of profitability, there was no relation to number
of mergers in 9 of 14 industries; however, in the remaining 5 industries, the
relation was negative and statistically significant at the .10 level or better.
For the second measure of profitability, there was no relation in 6 of 14
industries; of the remaining 8 industries, the relation was negative and
statistically significant at the .10 level or better in all but 2 instances.
For the third measure of profitability, there was no relation in 7 of 14
industries; of the remaining 7, the relation was negative and statistically
significant at the .10 level or better in all but 1 instance.
Since, when any relation between mergers and profitability existed, that
relation was typically negative, Reid's findings definitely show an absence
of any positive relation. On balance, one might say that his results indicate
a weak negative relation; however, his tests are subject to serious deficiencies.
First, the use of number of acquisitions as an index of merger activity
probably weakens the negative relations where they exist and destroys them
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where they might have existed. That is, given that number of acquisitions
is positively, but weakly, correlated with assets (sales) acquired, use of num-
ber of acquisitions as the relevant measure introduces random measurement
error, which in turn weakens whatever relationship existed (presumably
negative). Moreover, his second and third measures of profit are hard to
rationalize. Weighting terminal year profits by the relative amount of shares
outstanding in 1951 relative to the number outstanding in 1961 "loads" the
test against those firms who rely heavily on external equity financing. Reid
justifies this weighting procedure on the grounds that certain mergers will
result in dilution of the acquiring firm's earnings. However, this procedure
does not enable one to evaluate a merger from the viewpoint of the pre-
merger stockholders.
Finally, Reid's failure to consider the total return to stockholders
(capital gains and cash dividends) generally invalidates the first measure of
profitability; and, the use of earnings change relative to assets and sales
seems to be a cumbersome measure. Reid would have been better advised
to simply use earnings per share rather than attempt to hold constant the
effect of dilution.
III. FUNCTIONAL ADVANTAGES OF MERGERS
With the possible exception of Dewing's study, all of the studies re-
viewed above have concentrated on the profitability of mergers from the
standpoint of the acquiring firm. However, a complete examination of
mergers requires a study of the gains received by the owners of acquired
firms and the aggregate gain in profits. In short, the profitability of mergers
has three dimensions: overall gains or losses, gains or losses for the acquiring
firm, and gains or losses for the acquired firm. I turn now to a consideration
of overall, or functional, gains in merger.10
A. The Rationale for Functional Gains in Mergers
Generally speaking, a merger or series of acquisitions can result in
functional gains if and only if the combined firm is more efficient (profitable)
than the firms entering the combination would have been had they re-
mained separate. Various authors have suggested many specific reasons for
expecting such gains." However, most of these ad hoc explanations can be
reduced to two principal factors: monopoly power and more efficient oper-
ation of the acquired firm.' 2 If a combination of previously independent
firms produces monopoly in some given market, we can surely expect the
combined firm to be more profitable than its component parts would have
10 For an examination of profitability from the viewpoint of acquired firms, see Gort &
Hogarty, supra note 1. The profitability of acquiring firms is considered in Hogarty,
supra note 1.
11 See, e.g., J. WESTON, THE ROLE OF MERGERS IN THE GROWTH OF LARGE FIRMS (1961).
12 Clearly, scale economies would be a special case of such "more efficient operation."
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been. The same would generally be true of firms which, before merger, were
below the minimum efficient size for their industry.
The nature of the more efficient operation or functional gains can vary
from situation to situation. Some consolidations might lead to lower produc-
tion costs, others to a reduction in distribution costs, etc. Alternatively, the
merger may lead to monopsony in lieu of monopoly power.
Nonetheless, if any of these advantages is to be meaningful, they must
result in greater profits.13 Hence, an attempt to measure the extent of func-
tional gains - from whatever source - can proceed under the assumption
that the effects will be manifested in the income statement. Therefore, I shall
say that a given merger produced functional gains if the profits of the com-
bined firm were greater than the aggregate profits predicted for each of the
firms entering the combination.
B. The Determination of Predicted Profits
Any attempt to predict profits in the absence of merger necessarily in-
volves consideration of the determinants of firm growth. Traditionally,
economic theorists have devoted scant attention to the problems of firml
growth. In a competitive industry, all firms are of optimum size. Any
exogenous increase in demand would customarily be captured by new en-
trants who would also attain optimum size. On the other hand, there have
been many attempts in recent years to describe the process of firm growth by
means of various stochastic models, such as the lognormal distribution and
Markov Chains.1 4 In addition to mergers, these studies generally seemed to
indicate that reasonably good predictions of firm growth could be obtained
by taking into account differing industry growth patterns and differing
initial sizes.
These considerations, together with the nature of available data, led to
a prediction of the firm's growth based on the growth of the average firm in
the industry. Using the growth of the average firm as a benchmark enables
one to account for differing industry growth rates and, to a lesser extent,
differing firm sizes. In addition, this device provides an approximation to
Marshall's "representative firm." 5
C. The Sample
This analysis was based on a sample of 43 firms selected randomly from
the 1965 edition of Moody's Industrial Manual. These 43 firms had made
acquisitions during 1953-1964 representing at least a 20 percent increase
1 Increased market share might be an acceptable alternative if the functional gains
have a very long gestation period and we presume a low discount rate for the firms' owners.
14 For a summary of recent work based on the lognormal distribution, see Silberman,
On Lognormality as a Summary Measure of Concentration, 57 AM. EcON. REv. 807 (1967).
An example of the use of Markov Chains is seen in Adelman, A Stochastic Analysis of the
Size Distribution of Firms, 53 J. Am. STAT. Ass'N 893 (1958).
15 See Frisch, Alfred Marshall's Theory of Value, 64 QJ. EcoN. 495 (1950).
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in sales (assets). The firms' acquisitions consisted primarily of publicly-held
corporations with published income statements and balance sheets. Secondly,
these 43 firms were widely dispersed in terms of initial size and nature of
primary activity (principal industry). Finally, there was a minimum of two
years between the year in which the (first) acquisition was completed and
1964, the terminal year of this study.
D. Two Measures of Functional Gains in Mergers
Given the above definition of functional gains (the profits of the com-
bined firm must exceed the aggregate profits predicted for each of the
component firms), and the above prediction technique, my (primary) index
of functional gains (for a merger of two firms in the same industry) was:
(1) FG1 = A1/[B 0 (I/1 0) + S0(11/1 0)]
where:
A = profits of the combined firm
B = profits of the buyer
S = profits of the seller
I = profits of average firm in industry
1, 0 = time subscripts referring to 1964 and the year preceding the
merger, respectively.
The measure of profits used was net income before taxes.16 These
profit data were obtained from Moody's Industrial Manual in the case of
the firms, and from the Internal Revenue Service Sourcebook, Statistics of
Income, Corporation Income Tax Returns in the case of the industry.
These unpublished industry data were used to obtain profits of the average
firm by dividing net income before taxes by number of returns.17 In ad-
dition, since all but a negligible fraction of the firms in the sample were
above $1 million in assets, I also defined the industries in question as con-
sisting of firms above $1 million in assets.
Mergers may be subject to a long gestation period. That is, a firm
might initially concentrate on increasing its market share (tending toward
a more efficient size) and hence, the benefits of the merger might not mean
early increases in profits. On the other hand, this is not a very plausible
argument. A more credible reason for expecting mergers to produce in-
creased market share is that the managers of the corporation pursue a goal
16 1 also attempted alternatives such as net income plus interest paid and cash flow,
but, as things turned out, the nature of the firm data was such that only an insignificant
number of cases had reliable data for these additional measures. If a particular acquiring
or acquired firm had negative premerger profits, I defined its predicted profits as zero.
All firms contained in the sample had positive aggregate premerger profits.
17 Number of returns provides only an approximation of the number of firms in an
ownership sense. For further details, see the Appendix.
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of sales maximization (perhaps subject to a minimum profit constraint).8
If sales maximization is the main goal of corporate managers and if mergers
are a means to this end, one might expect some tendency for mergers to
demonstrate functional gains in terms of market share.
In computing this alternative index, however, a slightly different pro.
cedure was chosen; i.e., a merger was considered to have resulted in func.
tional gains if the actual sales of the combined firm were greater than the
aggregate sales which could reasonably have been expected from the com-
ponent firms in the absence of merger. The criterion used was that the
firms entering the combination could have been expected to maintain their
respective "market shares." In more specific terms, the second index (again,
for a merger of two firms in the same industry) is:
(2) [FG 2 = al/[bo(il/io) + s0(il/io)]
where:
a = sales of the combined firm
b = sales of buyer
s = sales of seller
i = total industry sales
1, 0 = time subscripts referring to 1964 and the year preceding the
merger, respectively.
For both indexes, a particular merger must have a value in excess of
unity to be considered an example of functional gains due to merger. The
"scores" achieved by the firms in the sample will be presented after a con-
sideration of the relationship of the two indexes to some alternative
measures.
E. The Relationship of the Two Indexes to Some Alternative Measures
With regard to the main index, FG1, I was interested in the effects of
two basic changes: (1) What would have happened if the index were based
on all firms in the industry, and not just those above $1 million in assets?
(2) Would it have mattered if merely total industry profits were used in-
stead of the profits of the average firm in the industry?
The answer to both questions is no. As shown in Table I, it would
have made almost no difference if the index had been based on total profits
instead of profits for the average firm. Excluding firms below $1 million in
assets had a greater impact. This was largely due to the fact that the lowest
size classes contain marginal firms, many of which may operate in regional
markets and/or are minor subsidiaries of larger firms. In addition, cor-
porations are given the option of consolidating or not consolidating sub-
sidiaries. 19 It is impossible to ascertain the net impact of this option given
18 For an argument along these lines, see W. BAUMOL, BUSINEss BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND
GROWTH (1959).
19 This fact is discussed in the Appendix.
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TABLE I
SIMPLE CORRELATON COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN FG1 AND ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
Number of Correlation
Name of alternative measure observationsl coefficient
(1) FG12 except that profits of the average firm are com-
puted so as to include all firms in industry, regardless
of size. 41 .80
(2) FG1 3 except that total industry profits for firms
above $1 million in assets are used in lieu of profits of
the average firm. 41 .96
1 The number of observations was reduced because two firms had negative pretax
profits in the terminal year. All other firms had positive aggregate profits for both pre-
merger and terminal years. If a particular firm had negative profits in the premerger year,
I defined its predicted profits as zero.
2 FG 1, the primary index of functional gains, consists of profits of the combined firm
divided by aggregate profits predicted for each of the firms entering the combination.
Predicted profits were obtained by assuming that each of the component firms would have
grown at the same rate as the average firm in its respective industry. Profits for the
average firm were based on total profits divided by the number of firms - excluding those
firms having $1 million or less in total assets.
3 Id.
to reporting corporations, but my experience leads me to believe that the
universe of firms above $1 million in assets is the more meaningful one.
For the secondary index, FG 2, the effect of the size cutoff was more
pronounced (see Table II). However, even in this case, the correlation co-
efficient was high.
TABLE II
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT BETWEEN FG 2 AND ALTERNATIVE MEASURE
Number of Correlation
Name of alternative measure observations1  coefficient
FG22 except that industry sales are defined to exclude
firms below $1 million in assets. 41 .73
1 Two firms were excluded because they seemed to represent instances of vertical
integration.
2 FG2 , the functional gains index based on sales, consists of sales of the combined firm
divided by aggregate sales predicted for each of the firms entering the combination.
Predicted sales were obtained by assuming that each of the component firms would have
grown at the same rate as its respective industry. In short, I assume that each of the
firms entering the combination would have maintained its market share in the absence of
merger. Industry sales were defined so as to include all firms regardless of size.
F. The Extent of Functional Gains in Mergers
As can be observed from equations 1 and 2, the indexes of functional
gains have been set up so that unity represents the break-even point. In
this context 20 out of 41 firms achieved functional gains in terms of profits
and 15 out of 41 in terms of sales.20 Thus, in this regard one might figura-
20 For the latter result, the "z" value was -1.72, which is significant at the .10 level
for an hypothesized probability of .50 in a two-tail test.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tively say that mergers are a "zero sum game" in terms of profits and a
"negative sum game" in terms of sales.
To further examine the distribution of these indexes, I divided the
firms in the sample into three groups:21 those showing functional losses,
those which were ambiguous, and those demonstrating functional gains. As
shown in Table III, the firms in the sample gave some evidence of func-
TABLE III
DISTRIBUrON OF FUNCTIONAL GAINS INDEXES
FG,1 FG22
Losses 19 24
Ambiguous 5 9
Gains 17 8
Median: 0.97 Median: 0.86
Mean: 1.17 Mean: 0.96
Standard deviation: 0.92 Standard deviation: 0.48
r = .22 with n = 393
The category limits were as follows:
0.00 < FGt < 0.90 Losses
0.90 < FG, < 1.10 Ambiguous
1.10 < FG Gains
Where FG = index of functional gains (i = 1, 2).
1 For this index two firms were excluded because of negative profits. FG1 consists of
the profits of the combined firm divided by aggregate predicted profits of firms entering
the combination. Predicted profits are obtained by assuming a growth rate for the com-
ponent firms equal to that of the average firm in their respective industries.
2 For this index two observations were eliminated because they represented instances
of vertical integration. FG2 consists of the sales of the combined firm divided by aggregate
predicted sales, which are obtained by assuming that, if no merger had occurred, each of
the component firms would have maintained its respective market share.
3 The two eliminations from each of the index measures did not overlap, thus resulting
in a net correlation sample of 39 observations.
tional gains in terms of profit but none in terms of sales. In addition,. the
correlation between the two indexes was only .22.
Losses and gains are just about the same for the index based on profits,
whereas for the index based on sales the losses outnumber the gains by three
to one. Thus there appears to be no tendency for corporate mergers to result
in greater gains in sales than in profits. In fact, the opposite appears to be
true.
Even more interesting is the fact that both distributions are highly
skewed (to the right). This skewness is especially noticeable in the case of
the index based on profits (FG1 ). From this index it is clear that, while the
typical merger produces no functional gains, a few mergers are extremely
profitable.
211 chose a classification scheme in which a deviation of 10 percentage points from
unity was considered indeterminate because experience with the data indicated that this
approximated the maximum amount of error. In any event, experimentation demonstrated
that alternative cutoff points made little difference.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
What can fifty years of research tell us about the profitability of mergers?
Undoubtedly the most significant result of this research has been that no one
who has undertaken a major empirical study of mergers has concluded that
mergers are profitable, i.e., profitable in the sense of being "more profitable"
than alternative forms of investment. A host of researchers, working at dif-
ferent points in time and utilizing different analytic techniques and data,
have but one major difference: whether mergers have a neutral or negative
impact on profitability.
Not all this evidence is contradictory. For example, given that mergers
do not produce functional gains, the tendency of acquiring firms to pay sub-
stantial premiums to effect mergers would generally ensure losses for the
acquirer and gains for the acquired firm. Hence, mergers can be regarded
as both negative and neutral with respect to profits, depending on whether
one is speaking of merger profitability overall or from the standpoint of the
acquiring firm.22
But if mergers are not profitable, why do they occur? More to the point,
why have they increased dramatically in 1967-1968?
I First of all, the results of my tests of functional gains in merger in-
dicate that sales are not pursued at the expense of profits. Hence, these
results give no indication of sales maximization as a goal of corporate man-
agement. Assuming that sales maximization and other non-profit goals would
be correlated, it appears that mergers are not a significant vehicle for the
pursuit of non-profit goals.
I showed above that: (1) the average merger produces zero functional
gains and (2) some mergers produce extraordinary profits. Hence, mrgers
can be thought of as a "zero sum, risky game." Thus, mergers would e an
attractive form of investment for those firms whose managers are "risk-
takers." 28 Assuming that the number of "risk-takers" in the economy remains
more or less constant over time, one can expect a more or less constant level
of merger activity. Thus, mergers will occur at a more or less constant rate
even in the absence of functional gains.
But what of the recent rise in the merger rate?24 The general answer
to this question is contained in a recent article by Michael Gort.25 Briefly,
Gort shows that mergers occur in response to "disturbances" in the economy,
such as rapid'increases in stock prices and accelerated technical change. Ac-
cordingly, merger activity can be expected to exhibit sporadic bursts in
response to (unanticipated) disturbances in the economy. The specific dis-
22 For details and relevant evidence, see Gort & Hogarty, supra note 1.
28 This seems an apt description of the managers of the so-called "conglomerates,"
who have played such a colorful role in the recent merger movement.
24 The number of mergers has increased almost continuously for many years,- but the
merger rate (number of firms acquired relative to the population of firms) increased
dramatically only in 1967-1968. See Gort & Hogarty, supra note 1.
2 5 See Gort, An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers, 83 Q.J. ECON. 624 (1969).
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turbances which generated the current merger wave are a subject for future
inquiry.
APPENDIX
FiRM DATA
Anyone who has worked with published income statements is aware of the many
pitfalls usually encountered. All those firms with especially low quality data were elim-
inated from the sample.
There were two general sources of such low quality data. The first involved lack of
information about selling firms. However, there were some further problems even among
firms that acquired publicly held corporations, the principal one being comparability of
income statement figures over time. For example, some firms initiated a practice of con-
solidating foreign subsidiaries after the merger. In part, this may have reflected a basic
change in their operating condition, but in some cases the transition was so great and so
abrupt as to be questionable. The ad hoc procedure I adopted was to drop those firms in
which the altered consolidation basis seemed at least partly arbitrary. With doubtful cases
I used the profits as stated. This gave a small margin of benefit to the firms in question,
because I also adopted the practice of ignoring all foreign acquisitions, whether consoli-
dated or not.
INDUSTRY DATA
The source for the industry data used in developing the indexes of functional gains
was the Internal Revenue Service Sourcebook, Statistics of Income, Corporation Income
Tax Returns. These unpublished data consist of income statement and balance sheet
figures for all 3-digit industries classified by asset size classes.
These industry data present two main problems, neither of which I could solve in
any ideal fashion. First, the raw data were uncorrected for industry reclassifications, espe-
cially the major one in 1958-1959. Secondly, firms are given the option of consolidating or
not consolidating subsidiaries when filing tax returns.2 6 Therefore, the data on profits and
number of returns are subjected to some spurious variation. Partially as a byproduct of
this, the data are also characterized by considerable heterogeneity.
In handling both of these problems, I closely adhered to the procedure used earlier
by Stigler and set out in Appendixes A and E of his book.27 In the absence of transition
tables,2S Stigler and his co-worker, Claire Friedland, utilized Census of Manufactures data
on value added29 in order to reallocate IRS data among the affected industries. For
example, if industry 1111 were taken from industry group 111 and reclassified into industry
group 112, then both industry groups would receive adjusted figures based upon the
percentage contribution of industry 1111.
If a particular 3-digit industry had been subjected to violent reclassification (e.g.,
greater than 15 percent of receipts), then i-digit data was used in its place. An addi-
tional and related procedure was the combining of various 3-digit industries. In fact,
combination of 3-digit industries and resort to 2-digit industries were the principal
methods of adjustment used.
The fact that corporations could report on either a consolidated or unconsolidated
basis turned out to be a more intractable problem. In an attempt to cope with this diffi-
culty, I examined the size class data in each of the industries in the hope of discovering
erratic shifts. Other than combination or elimination of industries, however, no satisfactory
method of combating the problem was found.
26 Since World War II most firms have filed on a deconsolidated basis. Hence, number
of return often means little if one defines firms strictly on an ownership basis. However,
the main problem has to do with comparability over time.
27 See G. STIGLER, CAPITAL AND RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 107-202,
220-26 (1963).
28 The Internal Revenue Service provided transition tables for the reclassification of
its 1948-1949 data. No such tables were provided for the 1958-1959 changes.
29 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS OF MANUFACTURERS: INDUSTRY STATISTICS, GENERAL
SUMMARY C19-C36 (1958).
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There were some additional, albeit minor, problems. For one thing, there were no
Sourcebook data for 1952-1953. The solution of this problem consisted of mere inter-
polation.30 Also, there was the additional difficulty that the industry data are not on a
calendar-year basis. For this minor problem there was a two-stage procedure. First of all,
some of the firms in the sample used a "fiscal year" of one sort or another. In those cases
I used fiscal year data ending in the calendar-year in question. For example, if a firm's
accounts were stated in terms of a fiscal year ending in June, I treated the profits for
July 1963 through June 1964 as calendar 1964 profits. The second stage amounted to
using (for those firms with accounts on a calendar-year basis) an average of 1963 and
1964 profits, together with 1963-1964 industry profits.
30 For 1962-1963 there were no size class data. Interpolation was used to resolve this
problem also.
